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Neural models of code have shown impressive performance for tasks such as predicting method names and
identifying certain kinds of bugs. In this paper, we show that these models are vulnerable to adversarial
examples, and introduce a novel approach for attacking trained models of code with adversarial examples.
The main idea is to force a given trained model to make an incorrect prediction as specified by the adversary
by introducing small perturbations that do not change the program’s semantics. To find such perturbations,
we present a new technique for Discrete Adversarial Manipulation of Programs (DAMP). DAMP works by
deriving the desired prediction with respect to the model’s inputs while holding the model weights constant,
and following the gradients to slightly modify the input code.
We show that our DAMP attack is effective across three neural architectures: code2vec, GGNN, and
GNN-FiLM, in both Java and C#. We show that DAMP has up to 89% success rate in changing a prediction
to the adversary’s choice (“targeted attack”), and a success rate of up to 94% in changing a given prediction
to any incorrect prediction (“non-targeted attack”). To defend a model against such attacks, we examine a
variety of possible defenses empirically and discuss their trade-offs. We show that some of these defenses
drop the success rate of the attacker drastically, with a minor penalty of 2% relative degradation in accuracy
while not performing under attack.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Neural models of code have achieved state-of-the-art performance on various tasks such as pre-
diction of variable names and types [Allamanis et al. 2018; Alon et al. 2018; Bielik et al. 2016;
Raychev et al. 2015], code summarization [Allamanis et al. 2016; Alon et al. 2019a; Fernandes
et al. 2019], code generation [Alon et al. 2019b; Brockschmidt et al. 2019; Murali et al. 2017], code
search [Cambronero et al. 2019; Liu et al. 2019; Sachdev et al. 2018], and bug finding [Pradel and
Sen 2018; Rice et al. 2017; Scott et al. 2019].
In other domains, such as computer vision, deep models have been shown to be vulnerable to
adversarial examples [Goodfellow et al. 2014b; Szegedy et al. 2013]. Adversarial examples are inputs
crafted by an adversary to force a trained neural model to make a certain (incorrect) prediction.
Generation of adversarial examples was demonstrated for image classification [Goodfellow et al.
2014a,b; Kurakin et al. 2016; Mirza and Osindero 2014; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. 2016; Nguyen et al.
2015; Papernot et al. 2017, 2016; Szegedy et al. 2013] and for other domains [Alzantot et al. 2018a,b;
Belinkov and Bisk 2017; Carlini and Wagner 2018; Ebrahimi et al. 2017; Pruthi et al. 2019; Taori et al.
2019]. The basic idea underlying many of the techniques for generating adversarial examples is to
add specially-crafted noise to a correctly labeled input, such that the model under attack yields a
desired incorrect label when presented with the modified input (i.e., with the addition of noise).
The idea of adding noise to a continuous object to change the prediction of a model is relatively
easy to attain mathematically. For example, for an image, this can be achieved by changing the
intensity of pixel values [Goodfellow et al. 2014b; Szegedy et al. 2013]. Unfortunately, this does
not carry over to the domain of programs, since a program is a discrete object that has to maintain
semantic properties.
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Correctly predicted example Adversarial perturbations
Target: contains Target: escape
void f1(int[] array){
boolean swapped = true;
for (int i = 0;
i < array.length && swapped; i++){
swapped = false;
for (int j = 0;
j < array.length-1-i; j++) {
if (array[j] > array[j+1]) {
int temp = array[j];
array[j] = array[j+1];
array[j+1]= temp;
swapped = true;
}
}
}
}
void f2(int[] ttypes){
boolean swapped = true;
for (int i = 0;
i < ttypes.length && swapped; i++){
swapped = false;
for (int j = 0;
j < ttypes.length-1-i; j++) {
if (ttypes[j] > ttypes[j+1]) {
int temp = ttypes[j];
ttypes[j] = ttypes[j+1];
ttypes[j+1]= temp;
swapped = true;
}
}
}
}
void f3(int[] array){
boolean swapped = true;
for (int i = 0;
i < array.length && swapped; i++){
swapped = false;
for (int j = 0;
j < array.length-1-i; j++) {
if (array[j] > array[j+1]) {
int temp = array[j];
array[j] = array[j+1];
array[j+1]= temp;
swapped = true;
}
}
} int upperhexdigits;
}
Prediction: sort (98.54%) Prediction: contains (99.97%) Prediction: escape (100%)
Fig. 1. A Java snippet f1 is classified correctly as sort by the model of code2vec.org. Given f1 and the target
contains, our approach generates f2 by renaming array to ttypes. Given the target escape, our
approach generates f3 by adding an unused variable declaration of int upperhexdigits. Additional
examples can be found in Appendix A.
In this paper, we present a novel approach for generating adversarial examples for neural models
for code. More formally:
Goal Given a program P and a correct prediction L made by a modelM, such that:M (P) = L,
find a semantically equivalent program P ′ such thatM makes a given adversarial prediction T of
the adversary’s choice:M (P ′) = T .
The main challenge in tackling the above goal is how to explore the vast space of programs that
are semantically equivalent to P, and find a program for whichM will predict T .
Space of Semantically Equivalent ProgramsGenerally, we can define a set of semantic-preserving
transformations, which in turn induce a space of semantically equivalent programs. For example, we
can: (i) rename variables, and (ii) add dead code. There are clearly many other semantic preserving
transformations (e.g., re-ordering independent statements), but their application would require
a deeper analysis of the program to guarantee that they are indeed semantic preserving. In this
paper, therefore, we focus on the above two semantic-preserving transformations which can be
safely applied without any semantic analysis.
Brute-Force Exploration One naïve approach for exploring the space of equivalent programs
is to apply transformations randomly. We can apply transformations randomly to generate new
programs and use the model to make a prediction for each generated program. However, the
program space to be explored is exponentially large making exhaustive exploration prohibitively
expensive.
Our ApproachWe present a new technique called Discrete Adversarial Manipulation of Programs
(DAMP). The main idea in DAMP is to select semantic preserving perturbations by deriving the
output distribution of the model with respect to the model’s input and following the gradient to
modify the input, while maintaining the model weights constant. This allows DAMP to modify the
program in a way that preserves its semantics but causes a model to make adversarial predictions.
We show that models of code are susceptible both to targeted attacks that force a model to make a
specific (incorrect) prediction chosen by the adversary, as well as to simpler non-targeted attacks
that force a model to make an incorrect prediction without a specific target prediction in mind. Our
approach is a “white-box” approach, since it assumes that the attacker has access to either the
model under attack or to a similar model. 1 Under this assumption, our approach is general and is
applicable to any model that can be derived with respect to its inputs, namely, any neural model. We
do not make any assumptions about the internal details or specific architecture of the model under
attack.
To mitigate these attacks, we evaluate and compare a variety of defensive approaches. Some of
these approaches work by re-training the model using another loss function or a modified version
of the same dataset; others defensive approaches are “modular”, in the sense that they can be placed
in front of an already-trained model, identify perturbations in the input, and feed a masked version
of the input into the vulnerable model. These defense mechanisms allow us to trade off the accuracy
of the original model for improved robustness.
Main Contributions The contributions of this paper are:
• The first technique for generating targeted adversarial examples for models of code. Our
technique, called Discrete Adversarial Manipulation of Programs (DAMP), is general and only
requires that the attacker is able to compute gradients in the model under attack (or a similar
model). DAMP is effective in generating both targeted and non-targeted attacks.
• An experimental evaluation of attacking three neural architectures: code2vec [Alon et al.
2019c], GGNN [Allamanis et al. 2018], and GNN-FiLM [Brockschmidt et al. 2019] in two
languages: Java and C#. Our evaluation shows that our adversarial technique can change a
prediction to the adversary’s desire (“targeted attack”) up to 89% of the times, and is successful
in changing a given prediction to an incorrect prediction (“non-targeted attack”) 94% of the
times.
• A thorough evaluation of techniques for defending models of code against attacks that perturb
names, and an analysis of their trade-offs. When some of these defenses are used, the success
rate of the attack drops drastically for both targeted and non-targeted attacks, with a minor
penalty of 2% on accuracy.
2 OVERVIEW
In this section, we provide an informal overview.
2.1 Motivating Examples
We begin by demonstrating our technique on two examples, which address two different tasks,
using two different neural models and in two programming languages (Java and C#).
Bypass Semantic Labeling (code2vec - Java)We demonstrate how our approach can force the
code2vec [Alon et al. 2019c] model to predict a label of our choice. Consider the code snippet f1
of Figure 1. This code snippet sorts a given array. The code2vec model [Alon et al. 2019c] applied
to this code snippet predicts the correct name, sort, with a probability of 98.54%.
Given the code snippet f1 and the arbitrarily chosen adversarial target contains, our approach
finds that renaming the original variable array to ttypes in f2 forces the model to predict the
label contains with an even higher probability, although the functionality remained the same.
We denote this as a VarName attack.
Given the code snippet f1 and the adversarial target escape, our approach finds that adding an
unused variable (hence, dead code) named upperhexdigits to the end of f1 forces the model to
1As recently shown by Wallace et al. [2020], this is a reasonable assumption – an attacker can imitate the model under
attack by: training an imitation model using labels achieved by querying the original model; craft adversarial examples
using the imitation model; and transfer these adversarial examples back to the original model.
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Correctly predicted example Adversarial perturbation
Target: SourceType
struct TypePair : IEquatable<TypePair>
{
public static TypePair Create<TSource,
TDestination>(TSource source,
TDestination destination, ...)
{
...
}
...
public Type SourceType { get; }
public Type DestinationType { get; }
public bool Equals(TypePair other) =>
SourceType == other.SourceType
&& DestinationType
== other. DestinationType ;
}
(a)
struct TypePair : IEquatable<TypePair>
{
public static TypePair Create<TSource,
TDestination>(TSource source,
TDestination scsqbhj, ...)
{
...
}
...
public Type SourceType { get; }
public Type DestinationType { get; }
public bool Equals(TypePair other) =>
SourceType == other.SourceType
&& DestinationType
== other. SourceType ;
}
(b)
Fig. 2. A C# VarMisuse example which is classified correctly as DestinationType in the method Equals
by the GGNN model of Allamanis et al. [2018]. Given the code in Figure 2a and the target SourceType,
our approach renames a local variable destination in another method to the specific name scsqbhj,
making the model predict the wrong variable in the method Equals, thus (“maliciously”) introducing a real
bug in the method Equals. Additional examples are shown in Appendix A.
predict the label escape with a probability of 100% (see f3 in Figure 1). We denote this attack as a
DeadCode targeted attack.
In general, bypassing semantic labeling models can allow a variety of malicious behaviors. For
example, a malicious developer can spread malicious code to users, while the code will be classified
as “benign” by a malware detection model [Arp et al. 2014; David et al. 2019; Grosse et al. 2016; Saxe
and Berlin 2015; Wang et al. 2017]. In this paper, we demonstrate the ability to bypass semantic
labeling by applying our attack on the code2vec model (Figure 1), forcing the model to predict a
label of our choice.
Bypass Bug Detection (VarMisuse - C#) As another example, we demonstrate how our approach
can force a Graph Neural Network (GNN) model to choose a clear bug as the correct completion. In
Figure 2a, a GNN model trained on the VarMisuse task [Allamanis et al. 2018; Brockschmidt 2019]
in C# correctly chooses to “fill the blank” using the field DestinationType inside the method
Equals. By renaming a local variable called destination in another method to the specific name
scsqbhj (Figure 2b), the model chooses the incorrect field SourceType in the method Equals.
The fields DestinationType (correct) and SourceType (incorrect) have the same type; thus, the
code still compiles and the attack causes a real bug in Equals .
More generally, bypassing a bug detection model [Pradel and Sen 2018; Rice et al. 2017; Scott
et al. 2019] can allow a malicious developer inside an organization or inside an open-source project
to intentionally introduce bugs. In this paper, we demonstrate this ability using the VarMisuse task
[Allamanis et al. 2018; Brockschmidt 2019] on Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) (Figure 19), forcing
the model to choose an incorrect (but type-correct) variable.
In addition to the code2vec and VarMisuse tasks that we address in this paper, we believe that
adversarial examples can be applied to neural code search [Cambronero et al. 2019; Liu et al. 2019;
Sachdev et al. 2018] – a developer can attract users to a specific library or an open-source project
by introducing code that will be disproportionately highly ranked by a neural code search model.
2.2 Discrete Adversarial Manipulation of Programs (DAMP)
Consider the code snippet f1 of Figure 1 that sorts a given array. The code2vec model [Alon et al.
2019c] applied to this code snippet predicts the correct name, sort. Our goal is to find semantically
equivalent snippets that will cause an underlying model to yield an incorrect target prediction of
our choice.
Gradient-Based Exploration of the Program Space We need a way to guide exploration of
the program space towards a specific desired target label (in a targeted attack), or away from the
original label (in a non-targeted attack).
In standard stochastic gradient descent (SGD)-based training of neural networks, the weights of
the network are updated to minimize the loss function. The gradient is used to guide the update
of the network weights to minimize the loss. However, what we are trying to determine is not an
update of the network’s weights, but rather an “update” of the network’s inputs. A natural way to
obtain such guidance is to derive the desired prediction with respect to the model’s inputs while
holding the model weights constant, and follow the gradient to modify the inputs.
In settings where the input is continuous (e.g., images), modifying the input can be done directly
by adding a small noise value and following the direction of the gradient towards the desired
target label (targeted), or away from the original label (non-targeted). A common technique used
for images is the Fast Gradient Signed Method (FGSM) [Goodfellow et al. 2014b] approach, which
modifies the input using a small fixed ϵ value.
Deriving with respect to a Discrete Input In settings where the input is discrete, the first layer
of a neural network is typically an embedding layer that embeds discrete objects such as names
and tokens into a continuous space [Allamanis et al. 2016; Alon et al. 2019a; Iyer et al. 2016]. The
input is the index of the symbol, which is used to look up its embedding in the embedding matrix.
The question for discrete inputs is therefore, what does it mean to derive with respect to the model’s
inputs?
One approach is to derive with respect to the embedding vector which is the result of the
embedding layer. In this approach, after the gradient is obtained, we need to reflect the update
of the embedding vector back to discrete-input space. This can be done by looking for nearest-
neighbors of the updated embedding vector in the original embedding space, and finding a nearby
vector that has a corresponding discrete input. In this approach, there is no guarantee that following
the gradient is the best step.
In contrast, our Discrete Adversarial Manipulation of Programs (DAMP) approach is to derive
with respect to a one-hot vector that represents the distribution over discrete values (e.g., over
variable names). In other words, instead of deriving by the input itself, the gradient is taken with
respect to the distribution over the inputs. Intuitively, this allows us to directly obtain the best
discrete value for following the gradient.
Targeted gradient-based attack Using our gradient-based method, we explore the space of
semantically equivalent programs directly toward a desired adversarial target. For example, given
the code snippet f1 of Figure 1 and the desired target label contains, our approach for generating
adversarial examples automatically infers the snippet f2 of Figure 1. Similarly, given the target
label escape, our approach automatically infers the snippet f3 of Figure 1.
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Fig. 3. Illustration of gradient descent, subscripts denote different time steps: in each step, the gradient is
computed w.r.t. θi for calculating a new θi+1 by updating θi towards the opposite direction of the gradient,
until we reach a minimum value of J.
All code snippets of Figure 1 are semantically equivalent. The only difference between f1 and f2
is the name of the variables. Specifically, these snippets only differ in the name of a single variable,
which is named array in f1 and ttypes in f2. Nevertheless, when array is renamed to ttypes,
the prediction made by code2vec changes to the desired (adversarial) target label contains.
The difference between f1 and f3 is the addition of a single variable declaration int upperhexdigits,
which is never used in the code snippet. Nevertheless, adding this declaration changes the prediction
made by the model to the desired (adversarial) target label escape.
3 BACKGROUND
In this section we provide a fundamental background about neural networks and adversarial exam-
ples.
3.1 Training Neural Networks
A Neural Network (NN) model can be viewed as a function fθ : X → Y where X is the input
domain (image, text, code, etc.) and Y is usually a finite set of labels. Assuming a perfect classifier
h∗ : X → Y , the goal of the function fθ is to assign the correct label y ∈ Y (which determined by h∗)
for each input x ∈ X . In order to accomplish that, fθ contains a set of trainable weights (denoted by
θ ) that can be adjusted to fit a given labeled training set T = {(x ,y)|x ∈ X¯ ⊂ X ,y ∈ Y ,y = h∗(x)}.
The process of adjusting θ (i.e., training) is done by solving an optimization problem defined by a
certain loss function J (θ ,x ,y) (usually Mean Square Error or Cross Entropy) which estimates the
model’s generalization ability:
θ ∗ = argmin
θ
∑
(x,y)∈T
J (θ ,x ,y) (1)
One of the most common algorithms to approximate the above problem is gradient descent [Cauchy
[n. d.]] using backpropagation [Kelley 1960]. When gradient descent is used for training, the
following update rule is applied repeatedly to update the model’s weights:
θt+1 = θt − η · ∇θ J (θt ,x ,y) (2)
where η is hyper parameter called learning rate. Intuitively, the gradient descent algorithm can
be viewed as taking small steps in the direction of the steepest descent, until reaching a (possibly
local) minimum. This process is illustrated in Figure 3 where θ contains a single trainable variable.
3.2 Adversarial Examples
Neural network models are very popular and have been applied in many domains, including
computer vision [He et al. 2016; Krizhevsky et al. 2012; Simonyan and Zisserman 2014; Szegedy
et al. 2015], natural language [Cho et al. 2014; Hochreiter and Schmidhuber 1997; Mikolov et al.
2010], and source code [Allamanis et al. 2018, 2016; Alon et al. 2019a, 2018; Bavishi et al. 2018;
Bielik et al. 2016; Brockschmidt et al. 2019; Liu et al. 2019; Lu et al. 2017; Murali et al. 2017; Pradel
and Sen 2018; Raychev et al. 2015; Rice et al. 2017; Sachdev et al. 2018].
However, although neural networks have shown astonishing results in many domains, they
were found to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. An adversarial example is an input which
intentionally forces a given trained model to make an incorrect prediction. For neural networks
that are trained on images, the adversarial examples are usually achieved by applying a small
perturbation on a given input image [Goodfellow et al. 2014b; Szegedy et al. 2013].
Recently, attempts were made to find adversarial examples in the domain of Natural Language
Processing (NLP). However, while adversarial examples on images are easy to generate, the gen-
eration of adversarial text is harder. This is due to the discrete nature of text and the difficulty of
generating semantic-preserving perturbations. One of the approaches to overcome this problem
is to replace a word with a synonym [Alzantot et al. 2018b]. Another approach is to insert typos
into words by replacing a few characters in the text [Belinkov and Bisk 2017; Ebrahimi et al. 2017].
However, these NLP approaches allow only non-targeted attacks.
Additionally, NLP approaches cannot be directly applied to code. NLP models don’t take into
account unique properties of code, such as multiple occurrences of variables; semantic and syntactic
patterns in code; the relation between different parts of the code; the readability of the entire code;
and whether or not the code still compiles after the adversarial mutation. So, applying NLP methods
on code domain makes the hard problem even harder.
4 ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES FOR MODELS OF CODE
In this section we describe the process of generating adversarial examples using our DAMP approach.
In Section 4.1 we define basic notations and the types of adversarial attacks. In Section 4.2 and
Section 4.3 we focus on each type of attack (“targeted” and “non-targeted”).
4.1 Definitions
Suppose we are given a trained model of code. The given model can be described as a function
fθ : C → L, where C is the set of all code snippets and L is a set of labels. We define Var (c) as
the set of all local variables existing in c . For brevity, in this section we focus only on generating
adversarial examples by variable renaming of the original variables (VarName). Nonetheless, our
approach can also be applied to a code snippet without changing the existing names, and instead
adding a redundant variable declaration (DeadCode insertion, see Section 6.1.2). In such a case,
our approach can be applied similarly by choosing an initial random name for the new redundant
variable, and selecting this variable as the variable we wish to rename.
Given a code snippet c ∈ C that the given trained model predicts as y ∈ L, i.e., fθ (c) = y, and
given an adversarial label ybad ∈ L of the adversary’s choice, the adversary’s objective is thus
to select a single variable v ∈ Var (c) and an alternative name v ′, such that renaming v to v ′ will
make the model predict the adversarial label: fθ (cv→v ′) = ybad .
The advantages of variable renaming as the form of semantic-preserving transformation are that
(i) each variable appears in several places in the code, so a single renaming can induce multiple
perturbations; (ii) the adversarial code can still be compiled and therefore stays in code domain;
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J
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Fig. 4. Gradient is computed for ybad loss function w.r.t. v . By moving toward the opposite direction of the
gradient (and replacing v with v ′), we decrease the loss of ybad .
and (iii) some variables don’t affect the readability of the code and hence renaming them creates
unnoticed adversarial examples.
We focus on two distinct types of adversarial examples:
• Targeted attack – forces the model to output a specific prediction (which is not the correct
prediction).
• Non-targeted attack – forces the model to make any incorrect prediction.
In high-level, the main idea in both kinds of attacks lies in the difference between the standard
approach of training a neural network using back-propagation and generating adversarial examples:
while training a neural network, we derive the loss with respect to the learned parameters and
update each learned parameter; in contrast, when generating adversarial examples, we derive the
loss with respect to the inputs while holding the learned parameters constant, and update the inputs.
4.2 Targeted attack
In this kind of attack, our goal is to make the model predict an incorrect desired label ybad by
renaming a given variable v to v ′. Let θ be the learned parameters of a model, c be the input code
snippet to the model, y be the target label and J (θ , c,y) be the loss function used to train the neural
model. As explained in Section 3.1, when training using gradient descent, the following rule is used
to update the model parameters and minimize J :
θt+1 = θt − η · ∇θ J (θt , c,y) (3)
Let ybad be the desired target label. We can apply a gradient descent step with ybad as the desired
label in the loss function, and derive with respect to any given variable v :
v ′ = v¯ − η · ∇v¯ J (θ , c,ybad ) (4)
where v¯ is the one-hot vector of v . The above action can intuitively be viewed (in Figure 4) as
taking a step toward the steepest descent. However, now the direction is determined by ybad ’s loss
function2.
In fact, the result of the above action does not produce a desired new variable name v ′, but
instead, a distribution over all possible variable names. To concretize the name of v ′, we choose the
argmax over the resulting distribution, as illustrated in Figure 6 and detailed in Section 4.4.
Search Sometimes, adversarial examples can be found by applying the adversarial step of Equa-
tion (4) once, but other times – multiple steps are needed, i.e., replacing v with v ′ and compute
gradient again with respect to v ′. We limit the number of times we apply the adversarial step by
a depth hyper-parameter. Additionally, instead of taking the arдmax from the distribution over
2Note that we have loss functions as the number of labels in Y, since each target label defines a different function of c .
Jvar
∇v J
vv ′
Fig. 5. Gradient ascent illustration: Gradient is computed with respect tov . By moving towards the gradient’s
direction (and replacing v with v ′), we increase the loss.
original variable name
v ′ = v¯ − η · ∇v¯ J (θ, x, ybad )
arдmax
adversarial variable name
Fig. 6. Perturbing a variable name: the original variable name is represented as a one-hot vector over the
variable-name vocabulary. After perturbation, the vector is no longer one-hot. We apply argmax to find the
most likely adversarial name, resulting with another one-hot vector over the variable-name vocabulary.
candidate names, we can try all “top-k”. These define a Breadth-First Search (BFS), where thewidth
parameter is defined by the “top-k”. Checking whether a choice of variable name results in the
desired output is cheap – it just requires computing the output of the model given the modified
input. Thus, it is conveniently feasible to perform multiple adversarial steps and check multiple
top-k candidates.
4.3 Non-Targeted Attack
In a non-targeted attack, our goal is to update v to v ′ in a way that will increase the loss to any
direction (instead of decreasing it, as in the training process). Thus, we compute the gradient with
respect to v and use Gradient Ascent:
v ′ = v¯ + η · ∇v¯ J (θ ,x ,y) (5)
This rule can be illustrated as taking a step toward the steepest ascent in the loss function (Figure 5).
The same BFS as in targeted attacks (Section 4.2) can be applied here as well.
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4.4 Deriving by Integer Indices
The operation of looking-up a row vector in an embedding matrix using its index is simple; some
common guides and tutorials describe this as taking the dot product between the embedding matrix
and a one-hot vector representing the index. In contrast with these guides, when implementing
neural networks there is usually no real need to use one-hot vectors at all, since all word embeddings
can be stored in a matrix such that each row in the matrix corresponds to a word vector. Looking
up a specific vector is then performed by simply looking up a row in the matrix using its index.
Nevertheless, in the context of adversarial examples, deriving the loss with respect to a single
variable name is equivalent to deriving with respect to an index, which is zero almost everywhere.
Thus, instead of using indices, we have to represent variable names using one-hot vectors, because
these can be derived. Looking up a vector in a matrix can then be performed by taking the dot
product of the embedding matrix with the one-hot vector. Deriving the loss by a one-hot vector
instead of an index is thus equivalent to deriving by the (differentiable) distribution over indices,
rather than deriving by the index itself. The result of each adversarial step is thus a distribution
over all variable names, in which we select the argmax (Figure 6).
5 DEFENSE AGAINST ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
To defend against adversarial attacks, we consider two broad classes of defense techniques. The first
class contains techniques that can be plugged on top of existing trained models, without re-training
and serve as a “gatekeeper” for incoming input. The second class contains techniques that require
re-training the model, possibly using a modified loss function or a modified version of the original
training set.
5.1 Defense Without Re-training
Techniques that do not require re-training are appealing because they allow to separate the optimiza-
tion of the model from the optimization of the defense and easily tune the balance between them.
Further, training neural models is generally computationally expensive; thus, these approaches
allow to perform the expensive training step only once.
These approaches can be described as placing a defensive-model д before the model of code fθ
that is independent of д. The goal of д is to fix the given input (if necessary) in a way that fθ will
predict correctly. Mathematically, the new model can be defined as composing the two models
fθ ◦ д. We assume that the adversary has access to the model fθ being attacked, but not to the
defense model д.
In this paper, we evaluate the following approaches that do not require re-training:
No Vars - a conservative defensive approach that replaces all variables to an UNK (“unknown”)
symbol, only at test time. This approach is 100% robust by construction, but does not leverage
variable names for prediction.
Outlier Detection – this approach tries to identify an outlier variable name and filter it out by
replacing only this variable with UNK. The main idea is that the adversarial variable name is likely
to have a low contextual relation to the other, existing, identifiers and literals in code. We detect
outliers by finding an outlier variable in terms of L2 distance among the vectors of the existing
variable names. Given a code snippet c ∈ C, we define Sym(c) as the set of all identifiers and literals
existing in c . We select the variable z∗ which is the most distant from the average of the other
symbols:
z∗ = argmax
z∈Var (c)
∑v ∈Sym(c),v,z vec (v)|Sym (c)| −vec (z)2 (6)
We then define a threshold σ that determines whether z∗ is an outlier: if the L2 distance between
the vector of z and the average of the rest of the symbols is greater than σ – then z is replaced with
an UNK symbol; otherwise, the code snippet is left untouched. Practically, the threshold σ is tuned
on a validation set, and determines the trade-off between the effectiveness of the defense and the
accuracy while not under attack, as we evaluate and discuss in Section 6.3.3.
5.2 Defense With Re-training
Re-training the original model allows, hopefully, to train the model to be robust while, at the same
time, training the model to perform as well as the non-defensive model. Re-training allows to train
the model to be less vulnerable from the beginning, rather than patching a vulnerable model using
a separate defense.
In this paper, we evaluate the following techniques that do require re-training:
Train Without Vars – replaces all variables with an UNK symbol both at training and test time.
This approach is also 100% robust by construction (as No Vars that does not require re-training).
It is expected to perform better than No Vars in terms of F1 because it is trained not to rely on
variable names, and use other signals instead. However, the downside is that it requires training a
model from scratch, while No Vars can be applied to an already-trained model.
Adversarial Training – follows Goodfellow et al. [2014b], and trains a model on the original
training set, while learning to perform the original predictions and training on adversarial examples
at the same time. Instead of minimizing only the expected loss of the original distribution, every
example from the training set (x ,y) ∈ T contributed both to the original loss J (θ ,x ,y), and to
an adversarial loss Jadv (θ ,x ′,y), where x ′ is a perturbed version of x , which was created using a
single BFS step of our non-targeted attack (Section 4.3). During training, we minimized J + Jadv
simultaneously.
Adversarial Fine-Tuning – follows Hosseini et al. [2017], and trains a model for several epochs
with the original examples from the training set using the original loss J (θ ,x ,y); then, after
the model is trained for optimal performance, the model is fine-tuned on adversarial examples.
During fine-tuning, the model is trained for a a single iteration over the training set, and only on
adversarial versions of each training example, using the adversarial loss Jadv (θ ,x ′,y). The hope
in this approach is to establish the model’s high performance first, and then ensure the model’s
robustness to adversarial examples because of the recency of the fine-tuning.
No Defense, |vocab|={10k, 50k, 100k} – trains the original model with a smaller vocabulary. Lim-
iting the vocabulary size might improve robustness by ignoring rare variable names: names that
are observed in the training or test data but are out of (the limited) vocabulary – are replaced with
a special UNK symbol. This way, the hope is that the model will consider only frequent names;
because of their frequency, these names will be observed enough times at training time and their
vector representation is more stable.
6 EVALUATION
Our set of experiments comprises two parts: (a) evaluating the ability of DAMP to change the
prediction of the downstream classifier (targeted and non-targeted attacks); and (b) evaluating a
variety of defense techniques and their ability to mitigate the attacks.
We note that our goal is not to perform a robustness evaluation of the attacked models themselves.
For robustness evaluation for models of code, we refer the reader to Ramakrishnan et al. [2020]
and Bielik and Vechev [2020]. Instead, the goal of this section is to evaluate the effectiveness of our
proposed targeted and non-targeted attacks, and to evaluate the robustness that different defense
techniques provide a given model.
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6.1 Setup
6.1.1 Downstream Models. We evaluate our DAMP attack using three popular architectures as
downstream models. We obtained the trained models from their original authors, who trained the
models themselves.
code2vec was introduced by Alon et al. [2019c] as a model that predicts a label for a code snippet.
The main idea is to decompose the code snippet into AST paths, and represent the entire snippet as
a set of its paths. The model was demonstrated by large scale training to predict a method name
conditioned on the method body. The goal of the attack is to thus change the predicted method
name by perturbing the method body. This model takes Java methods as its inputs, and it represents
variable names using a vocabulary of learned embeddings.
Gated Graph Neural Networks (GGNNs) were introduced by Li et al. [2016] as an extension to
Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) [Scarselli et al. 2008]. The main idea is to represent the problem as
a graph, and to aggregate the incoming messages to each vertex with the current state of the vertex
using a GRU [Cho et al. 2014] cell. GGNNs were later adopted to source code tasks by Allamanis
et al. [2018], who applied them to the VarMisuse task of predicting the correct variable in a given
blank slot among all variables in scope.
GNN-FiLM is a GNN architecture that was recently introduced by Brockschmidt [2019]. It differs
from prior GNN models in its message passing functions which compute the “neural message”
based on both the source and target of each graph edge, rather than the source only as previous
architectures. GNN-FiLM was shown to perform well for both the VarMisuse task as well as other
graph-based tasks such as protein-protein interaction and quantum chemistry molecule property
prediction. The goal of the attack here and in GGNNs is to make the model predict the incorrect
variable name, by changing an unrelated variable name which is neither the correct variable nor
the adversarial variable.
The GNN-FiLM and the GGNNmodels take C# methods as their inputs, and they represent variable
names using a character-level convolution. Thus, in our DAMP attack we derive the loss with respect
to the distribution over all characters in a given name, rather than deriving with respect to the
distribution over all variable names as in code2vec.
6.1.2 Adversarial Strategies. While there are a variety of possible adversarial perturbations, we
focus on two main adversarial strategies:
• Variable Renaming (VarName): choose a single variable, and iteratively change its name
until the model’s prediction is changed, using a BFS (as explained in Section 4). Eventually,
the “distance” between the original code and the adversarial code is a single variable name at
most.
• Dead-Code Insertion (DeadCode): insert a new unused variable declaration and derive
the model with respect to its name. The advantage of this strategy is that the existing code
remains unchanged, which might make this attack more difficult to notice. Seemingly, this
kind of attack can be mitigated by ignoring unused variables. Nonetheless, in the general
case, detecting an unreachable code is undecidable. We arbitrarily always placed the dead
code at the end of the input method, and used our attack to find a new name for the new
(unused) declared variable. In our preliminary experiments we observed that placing the dead
code anywhere else works very similarly. In this attack strategy, a single variable declaration
is inserted. Thus, the “distance” between the original code and the adversarial code is a single
variable declaration statement.
Other semantic-preserving transformations, such as statement swapping and operator swapping,
are not differentiable and thus do not enable targeted attacks.
When renaming variables or introducing new variables, we verified that the newly variable name
does not collide with an existing variable with the same name. In the code2vec experiments, we
used the adversarial step to run BFS with width = 2 and depth = 2. In GGNN we used width = 1
and depth = 3, and GNN-FiLM required depth = 10. We discuss these differences in Section 6.2.3.
Increasingwidth and depth can definitely improve the adversary’s success with the cost of longer
search.
6.1.3 Dataset. code2vec - Java We evaluate our proposed attack and defense on code2vec on
the Java-large dataset [Alon et al. 2019a]. This dataset consists of more than 16M Java methods
and their labels, taken from 9500 top-starred Java projects from GitHub that have been created
since January 2007. It contains 9000 projects for training, 200 distinct projects for validation and
300 distinct project for test. Methods with no local variables or arguments were filtered out from
evaluation, since they cannot be perturbed by variable renaming. To evaluate the effectiveness of
our DAMP attack, we focus on the examples that the model predicted correctly out of the test set of
Java-large. That is, on this filtered test set, the accuracy of the original code2vec model is 100% by
construction.
GGNN and GNN-FiLM - C#We evaluated DAMP on the GGNN and GNN-FiLM C# models on the
dataset of Allamanis et al. [2018]. This dataset consists of about 220,000 graphs (examples) from 29
top-starred C# projects on GitHub. For all examples, there is at least one type-correct replacement
variable other than the correct variable, up to a maximum of five candidates. DAMP always attacks
by modifying an unrelated variable – not the correct variable nor the adversarial target. In targeted
attacks, we randomly pick one out of the five candidates as the target for attach; in non-targeted
attack, our attacker tries to make the model predict any incorrect candidate. Similarly to Java, we
focus on the examples that each model predicts correctly out of the test set.
6.2 Attack
We focus on two main attack tasks: targeted and non-targeted attacks. For targeted attacks, we
used Equation (4) as the adversarial step. For non-targeted attacks, we used Equation (5) as the
adversarial step. For the desired adversarial labels, we randomly sampled labels that occurred at
least 10k times in the training set.
6.2.1 Metrics. Wemeasure the robustness of each setting to each of the different attack approaches
(the lower model robustness – the higher effectiveness of the attack).
In targeted attacks, the goal of the adversary is to change the prediction of the model to a label
of the attacker’s desire. We thus define robustness as the percentage of examples in which the
correctly predicted label was not changed to the adversary’s desired label. If the predicted label was
changed to a label that is not the adversarial label, we consider the model as robust to the targeted
attack.
In non-targeted attacks, the goal of the adversary is to change the prediction of the model to
any label other than the correct label. We thus define robustness as the percentage of examples in
which the correctly predicted label was changed to any other label than the correct label.
6.2.2 Baselines. Since our task is new, we are not aware of existing baselines. We thus compare
DAMP to different approaches in targeted, non-targeted attacks, code2vec and GNN models:
TFIDF is a statistical baseline for attacking code2vec: for every pair of a label and a variable
name it computes the number of times the variable appears in the training set under this label,
divided by the total number of occurrences of the variable in the training set. Then, given a desired
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VarName (robustness %) DeadCode (robustness %)
RandomVar TFIDF DAMP (this work) RandomVar TFIDF DAMP (this work)
Non-targeted 34.10 53.53 6.00 54.90 84.00 21.83
Targeted: CopyTarget CopyTarget
init 84.47 74.33 48.44 96.79 96.67 87.62
mergeFrom 72.79 9.01 10.39 99.82 29.34 22.65
size 99.47 77.91 78.27 99.97 98.98 95.96
isEmpty 88.61 98.11 79.04 99.98 99.72 87.63
clear 89.56 89.00 82.80 99.07 98.55 97.89
remove 84.94 84.83 63.15 99.29 99.24 80.02
value 99.77 71.81 76.75 100.0 98.16 98.33
load 86.75 85.46 55.65 99.03 97.22 86.65
add 92.88 86.72 68.60 99.93 95.29 93.75
run 95.11 40.92 51.52 99.36 62.87 77.63
Count best: 0 4 6 0 2 8
Table 1. Robustness of code2vec to our adversarial attacks, targeted and non-targeted, using VarName and
DeadCode, compared to the baselines (the lower robustness, the more effective the attack). DAMP is more
effective than the baselines in 6 out of 10 VarName randomly sampled targets and in 8 out of 10 DeadCode
targets.
adversarial label ybad , TFIDF outputs the variable name v that has the highest score with ybad :
TFIDF (ybad ) = arдmaxv #(ybad ,v)#(v) .
CopyTarget attacks code2vec with targeted attacks. CopyTarget replaces a variable with the desired
adversarial label. For example, if the adversarial label is badPrediction – CopyTarget renames a
variable to badPrediction as well.
CharBruteForce attacks GGNN and GNN-FiLM which address the VarMisuse task. CharBruteForce
changes the name of the attacked variable by randomly changing every character iteratively up to
a limited number of iterations.
RandomVar is used in non-targeted attacks on code2vec: RandomVar replaces the given variable
with a randomly selected variable name from the training set vocabulary.
In all experiments, the baselines were given the same number of trials as our attack: in RandomVar,
we randomly sampled the same number of times; in TFIDF, we used the top-k TF-IDF candidates
as additional trials; In CopyTarget, we took the target as the new variable name and its k-nearest
neighbors in the embedding space.
6.2.3 Attack - Results. code2vec Table 1 summarizes the results of DAMP on code2vec. The main
result is that DAMP outperforms the baselines by a large margin in both targeted and non-targeted
attacks.
In non-targeted attacks, DAMP attacks are much more effective than the baseline: for VarName,
code2vec is 6% robust to to DAMP, 34.10% robust to RandomVar and 53.53% robust to TFIDF. For
DeadCode, code2vec is 21.83% robust to DAMP, 54.90% robust to RandomVar and 84.00% robust to
TFIDF. Thus, DAMP’s attack is more effective than the baselines’.
In targeted attacks, DAMP performs better than CopyTarget at each of the randomly sampled
adversarial labels. For example, code2vec is only 10.39% robust to DAMP attacks that change the
GGNN Robustness GNN-FiLM Robustness
CharBruteForce DAMP (this work) CharBruteForce DAMP (this work)
Non-targeted 96.24 57.99 95.56 83.55
targeted 97.84 69.00 96.19 87.62
Table 2. Robustness of GGNN and GNN-FiLM to our adversarial attacks (targeted and non-targeted), com-
pared to CharBruteForce (the lower robustness, the more efficient the attack). Our attack is more effective
than brute-force given an equal number of trials. Every successful attack results in a type-safe VarMisuse bug.
prediction to the label mergeFrom, and 72.79% robust to the CopyTarget attack of the same target
adversarial label.
However, in some of the randomly sampled targets TFIDF was more effective than DAMP. In
VarName, DAMP was the most effective in 6 out the 10 randomly sampled adversarial targets, while
TFIDF was the most effective in the remaining 4. In DeadCode attacks, DAMP was the most effective
in 8 out of 10 randomly sampled adversarial targets, while TFIDF was the most effective in the
remaining 2. Although TFIDF performed better than DAMP for a few of the targets, the differences
were usually low. Overall, DAMP’s targeted attack is more effective than the baselines’.
Non-targeted attacks generally yield lower model robustness than targeted attacks. This is
expected, since non-targeted attacks try to change the label to any label other than the correct one,
while targeted attacks count as successful only if they change the prediction to the desired label.
In general, the VarName attack is more effective than DeadCode. We hypothesize that this is
because the inserted unused variable impacts only a small part of the code, hence might not have
a smaller numerical effect on the computation of the model. In contrast, renaming an existing
variable changes multiple occurrences in the code and thus has a wider effect.
GGNN and GNN-FiLM Table 2 summarizes the results of DAMP attack and the baseline on the
GGNN and GNN-FiLM models. The main result is that DAMP is much more effective than the
CharBruteForce baseline. The GGNN model is 69.00% robust to DAMP targeted attack, and 98.84%
robust to the baseline attack. The GNN-FiLM is 87.62% robust to DAMP attack and 96.19% robust to
the CharBruteForce attack.
Second, we see thatDAMP is more effective on code2vec than on both GNN architectures. code2vec
is 6% robust to non-targeted VarName attacks and GGNNs is 57.99% robust to non-targeted attacks.
There are several reasons for this difference between the attacked models:
(1) code2vec is simpler and more “neurally shallow”, while GGNN uses six layers of message
propagation steps, and GNN-FiLM uses ten layers.
(2) The models’ tasks are very different: code2vec classifies a given code snippet to one out
of about 200,000 possible target method names, while both GNN architectures address the
VarMisuse task and need to choose one out of only two to five possible variables.
(3) code2vec has orders of magnitude more trainable parameters (about 350M) than GGNN (about
1.6M) and GGNN (about 11.5M), making code2vec more sparse, its loss hyperspace more
complex, thus more vulnerable.
Finally, we see that the GNN-FiLM model is more robust than GGNN. Even though we used a
more aggressive BFS with ten gradient steps for GNN-FiLM and only three gradient steps for GGNN,
the GNN-FiLM robustness to DAMP targeted attack is 87.62%, while the GGNN robustness is 69.00%.
We hypothesize that this is primarily because the message passing function in GNN-FiLM, which
computes the sent message between nodes based on both source and target of each graph edge,
rather than the source only as in the GGNN, making it more robust to an attack on a single one
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Performance VarName DeadCode
(not under attack) Robustness (%) Robustness (%)
Prec Rec F1 Non-targeted Target: “run” Non-targeted Target: “run”
No Defense 100 100 100 6.0 51.52 22.83 77.63
No Vars 78.78 80.83 79.98 100 100 100 100
Outlier Detection 98.18 97.75 97.92 74.35 96.49 96.73 95.76
Train Without Vars 89.74 90.86 90.40 100 100 100 100
Adversarial Training 98.09 92.96 94.98 68.80 94.48 99.33 99.98
Adversarial Fine-Tuning 85.51 84.86 85.12 13.59 68.94 31.07 56.64
No Defense, |vocab |=10k 90.50 94.26 92.66 6.56 45.78 31.13 94.55
No Defense, |vocab |=50k 94.51 100 98.00 3.18 40.48 20.01 94.04
No Defense, |vocab |=100k 96.84 99.97 98.99 2.61 32.48 19.64 68.58
Table 3. Precision, Recall, F1 and robustness percentage of different models. The higher robustness, the more
effective the defense. Scores that are above 95% are marked in bold. Outlier Detection and Adversarial Training
are sweet-spots: they perform almost as good as No Defense in terms of precision, recall and F1, and they
almost as robust as the extreme No Vars.
of these nodes. Furthermore, the higher results of GNN-FiLM over GGNN in other graph-based
benchmarks [Brockschmidt 2019] hint that GNN-FiLM might be using the graph topology, i.e. the
program structure, to a larger degree, while the GGNN is focusing mainly on the names, and is
thus more vulnerable to name-based attacks. We leave the further investigation of the differences
between different GNN architectures for future work.
6.3 Defense
We experimented with all defense techniques as described in Section 5, in a code2vec model.
6.3.1 Metrics. We measure the success rate of the different defense approaches in preventing
the adversarial attack and increasing robustness. When evaluating alternative defenses, it is also
important to measure the performance of the original model while using the defense, but not under
attack: an overly defensive approach can lead to 100% robustness at the cost of reduced prediction
performance.
To tune the threshold σ of the Outlier Detection defense, we thus balance the following factors:
(1) the robustness of the model using this defense; and (2) the F1 score the model using this defense,
while not under attack. We tuned the threshold on the validation set, and chose σ = 2.7 since it
leads to 75% robustness against non-targeted attack with the cost of 2% degradation in F1 score
while not under attack. However, this threshold can be tuned according to the desired needs in the
trade-off between performance and defense (see Section 6.3.3).
6.3.2 Defense - Results. The effectiveness of the different defense techniques is presented in
Table 3. The main results are as follows: Outlier Detection provides the best performance and highest
robustness among the techniques that do not require re-training, achieving F1 of 97.02 and above
75.35% robustness for targeted and non-targeted attacks; among the techniques that do require
re-training, Adversarial Training achieves the highest performance and robustness among the
techniques that do require re-training: Adversarial Training achieves F1 score of 94.98 and above
68.80% robustness for targeted and non-targeted attacks.
The penalty of using Outlier Detection is only 2.18% degradation in F1 score compared to No
Defense. On the other extreme, Train Without Vars is 100% robust to VarName and DeadCode attacks,
but its F1 is degraded by 9.6% compared to No Defense. That is, Outlier Detection is a sweet spot in
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Fig. 7. The performance of each defense technique compared to its average robustness. Average robustness is
calculated as the average of the four robustness scores in Table 3. Points marked with a bullet (•) require
re-training; points marked with a star (⋆) do not require re-training. Outlier Detection provides the highest
performance and robustness among the techniques that do not require re-training; adversarial training
provides the highest performance and robustness among the techniques that do require re-training.
the trade-off between performance and robustness: it is 98% as accurate as the original model (No
Defense), and 74 − 96% as robust as the model that ignores variables completely.
Adversarial Training provides a sweet-spot among the techniques that do require re-training:
its penalty is 5.02% degradation in F1 score compared to No Defense, and it achieves over 99%
robustness to DeadCode and 94.48% robustness to targeted VarName. Adversarial training allows
the model to leverage variable names to achieve high performance while not under attack, but also
not to rely on variable names too much, and it is thus robust to adversarial examples. Adversarial
Fine-Tuning performs surprisingly worse than Adversarial Training, both in F1 score and in its
robustness.
No Vars is 100% robust as Train Without Vars, but is about 10 F1 points worse than Train Without
Vars. The only benefit of No Vars over Train Without Vars is that No Vars can be applied to a model
without re-training it.
Reducing the vocabulary size to 100k and 50k results in a negligible decrease in performance
while not under attack compared to not defending at all, but also results in roughly the same (poor)
robustness as not defending at all. Reducing the vocabulary size to 10k hurts performance while
not under attack and does not provide much robustness.
These results are visualized in Figure 7.
Table 4 shows the performance of the Outlier Detection and the Adversarial Training defenses
across randomly sampled adversarial labels.
6.3.3 Robustness - Performance trade-off. One of the advantages of the Outlier Detection defense,
which we found to be one of the most effective defense techniques, is the ability to tune its trade-off
between robustness and performance. Figure 8 shows the trade-off with respect to the similarity
threshold σ . Small values of σ make the model with Outlier Detection defense more robust, almost
as robust as No Vars, but perform worse in terms of F1 score; as the value of σ increases, the model
with Outlier Detection defense becomes less robust, but performs better while not under attack.
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VarName (robustness %) DeadCode (robustness %)
DAMP†
DAMP
+ Outlier
Detection
DAMP
+ Adversarial
Training
DAMP†
DAMP +
Outlier
Detection
DAMP
+ Adversarial
Training
init 48.44 74.32 78.17 87.62 91.41 99.97
mergeFrom 10.39 99.98 98.91 22.65 99.99 100.00
size 78.27 99.58 99.39 95.96 99.94 99.99
isEmpty 79.04 99.22 98.91 87.63 97.03 99.99
clear 82.8 98.77 85.09 97.89 99.56 99.99
remove 63.15 94.50 89.29 80.02 99.33 99.99
value 76.75 90.87 99.47 98.33 99.72 100.00
load 55.65 60.27 88.29 86.65 85.28 100.00
add 68.6 88.97 95.90 93.75 97.69 100.00
run 51.52 96.49 94.48 77.63 95.76 99.98
Table 4. Robustness of code2vec to adversarial attacks with the Outlier Detection and the Adversarial Training
defenses, across different adversarial targets (the higher the robustness — the more effective the defense).
DAMP† results are the same as in Table 1.
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Fig. 8. The Outlier Detection defense: the trade-off between robustness and performance-while-not-under-
attack, with respect to the similarity threshold σ on the validation set. The dashed vertical line at σ = 2.7
denotes the value that we chose for σ according to the validation set. A lower threshold leads to perfect
robustness and lower performance; a higher threshold leads to performance that is equal to the original
model’s, but the model is also as vulnerable as the original model. The robustness score is the robustness
against non-targeted VarName attacks.
void f(int[] array){
boolean swapped = true;
for (int i = 0; i < array.length && swapped; i++){
swapped = false;
for (int j = 0; j < array.length-1-i; j++) {
if (array[j] > array[j+1]) {
int temp = array[j];
array[j] = array[j+1];
array[j+1]= temp;
swapped = true;
}
}
}
}
Prediction: sort (98.54%)
void f(int[] mstyleids){
boolean swapped = true;
for (int i = 0;
i < mstyleids.length && swapped; i++){
swapped = false;
for (int j = 0; j < mstyleids.length-1-i; j++){
if (mstyleids[j] > mstyleids[j+1]) {
int temp = mstyleids[j];
mstyleids[j] = mstyleids[j+1];
mstyleids[j+1]= temp;
swapped = true;
}
}
}
}
void f(int[] possiblematches){
boolean swapped = true;
for (int i = 0;
i < possiblematches.length && swapped; i++){
swapped = false;
for (int j = 0; j < possiblematches.length-1-i; j++){
if (possiblematches[j] > possiblematches[j+1]){
int temp = possiblematches[j];
possiblematches[j] = possiblematches[j+1];
possiblematches[j+1]= temp;
swapped = true;
}
}
}
}
Prediction: get (99.99%) Prediction: indexOf (86.99%)
Fig. 9. A snippet classified correctly as sort by the model of code2vec.org. The same example is classi-
fied as get by renaming array to mstyleids and is classified as indexOf by renaming array to
possiblematches.
6.4 Additional Examples
All examples that are shown in this paper and in appendix A can be experimented with on their
original models at http://code2vec.org and https://github.com/microsoft/tf-gnn-samples.
Figure 9 shows additional targeted attacks against the “sort” example from Figure 1: renaming the
variable array to mstyleids changes the prediction to get with probability of 99.99%; renaming
array to possiblematches changes the prediction to indexOf with probability of 86.99%. The
predicted adversarial labels (get and indexOf) were chosen arbitrarily before finding the variable
name replacements.
Transferability Occasionally, a dead code attack is transferable across example – it has the same
effect even in different examples. This is demonstrated in Figure 10: adding the unused variable
declaration int introsorter = 0; to each of the multiple snippets changes their prediction
to sort with probability of 100%. This effect is reminiscent of the Adversarial Patch [Brown et al.
2017], that was shown to force an image classifier to predict a specific label, regardless of the input
example. However, expect a few cases, we found that adversarial examples generally do not transfer
across examples. We also did not find significant evidence that adversarial examples transfer across
models that were trained on the same dataset, e.g., from GNN-FiLM to GGNN. This is consistent
with Suciu et al. [2019] who found that adversarial examples are not transferable across different
models, and not even transferable across the same architecture trained on different training sets.
The question of whether adversarial examples are transferable in discrete domains such as code
remains open.
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String[] f(final String[] array) {
final String[] newArray =
new String[array.length];
for (int index = 0; index < array.length;
index++) {
newArray[array.length - index - 1]
= array[index];
}
return newArray;
}
String[] f(final String[] array) {
int introsorter = 0;
final String[] newArray =
new String[array.length];
for (int index = 0; index < array.length;
index++) {
newArray[array.length - index - 1]
= array[index];
}
return newArray;
}
Prediction: reverseArray (77.34%) Prediction: sort (100%)
int f(Object target) {
int i = 0;
for (Object elem: this.elements) {
if (elem.equals(target)) {
return i;
}
i++;
}
return -1;
}
int f(Object target) {
int introsorter = 0;
int i = 0;
for (Object elem: this.elements) {
if (elem.equals(target)) {
return i;
}
i++;
}
return -1;
}
Prediction: indexOf (86.99%) Prediction: sort (100%)
Fig. 10. Adding the dead code int introsorter = 0; to each of the snippets on the left changes their
label to sort with confidence of 100%. This is an example of how the same dead adversarial “patch” can be
applied across different examples.
GNNExamples Figure 11 showsAC#VarMisuse examplewhich is classified correctly as _getterBuilder
in the method GetGetter by the GGNN model. Given the code and the target _setterBuilder,
our approach renames a local variable setteril in another method, making the model predict the
wrong variable in the GetGetter method, thus introducing a real bug in the method GetGetter.
Figure 12 shows a similar GNN targeted adversarial example.
Other code2vec and GNNs examples are shown in Appendix A.
7 RELATEDWORK
Adversarial Examples of Images Szegedy et al. [2013] discovered that deep neural networks are
vulnerable to adversarial examples. They showed that they could cause an image classificationmodel
to misclassify an image by applying a certain hardly perceptible perturbation. Goodfellow et al.
[2014b] introduced an efficient way called “fast gradient sign method” for generating adversarial
examples. Their method was based on adding an imperceptibly vector whose elements are equal to
the sign of the elements of the gradient of the cost function with respect to the input. Generating
adversarial examples in images is probably easier than in discrete domains such as code and natural
language. Images are continuous objects, and thus can be perturbed with small unnoticed noise;
contrarily, our problem domain is discrete.
Adversarial Examples in NLP The challenge of adversarial examples for discrete inputs has
been studied in the domain of NLP. However, while adversarial examples on images are easy to
generate, the generation of adversarial text is harder. While images are continuous, and can thus be
added some noise – natural language text is discrete, and thus cannot be easily perturbed. HotFlip
Correctly predicted example Adversarial perturbation
Target: _setterBuilder
public class PropertyEmitter
{
...
public PropertyEmitter( ... )
{
...
ILGenerator setteril =
_setterBuilder.GetILGenerator();
setteril.Emit(OpCodes.Ldarg_0);
setteril.Emit(OpCodes.Ldarg_1);
setteril.Emit(OpCodes.Stfld, _fieldBuilder);
if (propertyChangedField != null)
{
setteril.Emit(OpCodes.Ldarg_0);
setteril.Emit(OpCodes.Dup);
setteril.Emit(
OpCodes.Ldfld,
propertyChangedField);
setteril.Emit(OpCodes.Ldstr, name);
setteril.Emit(
OpCodes.Call,
ProxyBaseNotifyPropertyChanged);
}
setteril.Emit(OpCodes.Ret);
_propertyBuilder.SetSetMethod(_setterBuilder);
}
...
public MethodBuilder GetGetter(Type requiredType)
=> !requiredType.IsAssignableFrom(PropertyType)
? throw new InvalidOperationException(
"Types are not compatible")
: _getterBuilder ;
}
(a)
public class PropertyEmitter
{
...
public PropertyEmitter( ... )
{
...
ILGenerator va =
_setterBuilder.GetILGenerator();
va.Emit(OpCodes.Ldarg_0);
va.Emit(OpCodes.Ldarg_1);
va.Emit(OpCodes.Stfld, _fieldBuilder);
if (propertyChangedField != null)
{
va.Emit(OpCodes.Ldarg_0);
va.Emit(OpCodes.Dup);
va.Emit(
OpCodes.Ldfld,
propertyChangedField);
va.Emit(OpCodes.Ldstr, name);
va.Emit(
OpCodes.Call,
ProxyBaseNotifyPropertyChanged);
}
va.Emit(OpCodes.Ret);
_propertyBuilder.SetSetMethod(_setterBuilder);
}
...
public MethodBuilder GetGetter(Type requiredType)
=> !requiredType.IsAssignableFrom(PropertyType)
? throw new InvalidOperationException(
"Types are not compatible")
: _setterBuilder ;
}
(b)
Fig. 11. A C# VarMisuse example which is classified correctly as _getterBuilder in the method
GetGetter by the GGNN model. Given the code and the target _setterBuilder, our approach re-
names a local variable setteril in another method, making the model predict the wrong variable in the
GetGetter method, thus introducing a real bug in the method GetGetter. The full example is shown in
Figure 16.
Correctly predicted example Adversarial perturbation
Target: SourceType
public MapRequest(TypePair requestedTypes,
TypePair runtimeTypes,
IMemberMap memberMap = null)
{
RequestedTypes = requestedTypes;
RuntimeTypes = runtimeTypes;
MemberMap = memberMap;
}
(a)
public MapRequest(TypePair chzuzb,
TypePair runtimeTypes,
IMemberMap memberMap = null)
{
RequestedTypes = chzuzb;
RequestedTypes = runtimeTypes;
MemberMap = memberMap;
}
(b)
Fig. 12. A C# VarMisuse example which is classified correctly by the GGNN model. Given the code and the
target RequestedTypes, our approach renames a local variable requestedTypes, making the model
predict the wrong variable, thus introducing a real bug.
[Ebrahimi et al. 2017] is a technique for generating adversarial examples that attacks a character-
level neural classifier. The idea is to flip a single character in a word (i.e., produce a typo) such
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that the change is hardly noticeable. Alzantot et al. [2018b] presented a technique for generating
“semantically and syntactically similar adversarial examples” that attack trained models. The main
idea is to replace a random word in a given sentence with a similar word (nearest neighbor) in
some embedding space. However, these techniques allow only non-targeted attacks, i.e., break a
correct prediction, without aiming for a specific adversarial label.
Adversarial Examples in Malware A few works explored adversarial examples in malware
detection: the ability to perturb a malicious binary such that a learning model will classify it
as “benign”. Kreuk et al. [2018], Suciu et al. [2019] and Kolosnjaji et al. [2018] addressed binary
classifiers (whether or not the program is malicious) of binary code, by adding noisy bytes to the
original file’s raw bytes. None of these works performed targeted attacks as our work. In most cases,
hiding an adversarial dead-code payload inside a binary might be easier than generating adversarial
examples in high-level languagess like Java or C#, as in our case. For example, Kolosnjaji et al.
[2018] reported that they injected at least 10,000 “padding bytes” to each malware sample; since a
binary file is usually much larger, injecting 10,000 bytes can go unnoticed. In contrast, in all our
attacks we renamed a singe variable or added a single variable declaration. Another difference from
our approach is that all these works derive the loss by the embedding vector itself, as we discuss in
Section 2.2. In contrast, we derive the loss by the distribution over indices (Section 4.4) that directly
optimizes towards the target label; this allows us to perform targeted attacks in multi-class models.
Rosenberg et al. [2018] addressed a very different scenario, and modified malicious programs to
mimic benign calls to APIs at runtime. Yang et al. [2017] presented a black-box approach to attack
non-neural models; their approach is not gradient-based, and thus cannot perform targeted attacks.
Adversarial Examples in High-Level Programs To the best of our knowledge, our work is the
first to investigate adversarial attacks for models of high-level code. Rabin et al. [2019] identified a
problem of robustness in models of code, without either suggesting a concrete method for producing
adversarial examples or a method to defend against them.
Defending against Adversarial Examples A few concurrent work with ours addressed the
problem of training models of code to be more robust. Ramakrishnan et al. [2020] performed
semantic-preserving transformations such as renaming, and trained neural models on the modified
code. However, their transformations are applied in the data preprocessing step, and their approach
does not use gradients nor targeted attacks. Bielik and Vechev [2020] focused on training robust
models as well, with an iterative approach for adversarial training. These works discussed only
approaches for adversarial training, but none of them presented targeted attacks, as our work.
Pruthi et al. [2019] found that NLP models perform much worse when the input contains spelling
mistakes. To make these models more robust to misspellings, the authors placed a character-level
word recognition model in front of the downstream model. This word recognition model fixes
misspellings before they are fed into the downstream model. The Outlier Detection defense that
we examined is similar in spirit, since it uses a composition of a downstream model following an
upstream defense model. The main difference between these two defenses resides in the goals of
these upstream defense models: the Outlier Detection model needs to detect outlier names, while
the model of Pruthi et al. [2019] detects character-level typos.
8 CONCLUSION
We presented DAMP, the first approach for targeted attacks of models of code using adversarial
examples. Our approach is a general white-box technique that can work for any model of code in
which we can compute gradients. We demonstrate DAMP on popular neural architectures for code:
code2vec, GGNN and GNN-FiLM, in Java and C#. We show that DAMP succeeds in both targeted and
non-targeted attacks, by renaming variables and by adding dead code.
We further experiment with a variety of possible defense techniques and discuss their trade-offs
across performance, robustness, and whether they require re-training or not.
We believe that the principles presented in this paper can be the basis for a wide range of
adversarial attacks and defenses. This is the first work to perform targeted attacks for models of
code; thus, using our attack in adversarial training contributes to more robust models. In realistic
production environments, the defense techniques that we examine can further strengthen the
robustness. To this end, we will make all our code publicly available.
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String f(String txt) {
txt = replace(txt, "&", "&amp;");
txt = replace(txt, "\"", "&quote;");
txt = replace(txt, "<", "&lt;");
txt = replace(txt, ">", "&gt;");
return txt;
}
Prediction: escape
Target: contains Target: done
String f(String expres) {
expres = replace(expres, "&", "&amp;");
expres = replace(expres, "\"", "&quote;");
expres = replace(expres, "<", "&lt;");
expres = replace(expres, ">", "&gt;");
return expres;
}
String f(String claimed) {
claimed = replace(claimed, "&", "&amp;");
claimed = replace(claimed, "\"", "&quote;");
claimed = replace(claimed, "<", "&lt;");
claimed = replace(claimed, ">", "&gt;");
return claimed;
}
Prediction: contains (94.99%) Prediction: done (77.68%)
Fig. 13. A snippet classified correctly as escape by the model of code2vec.org. The same example is classified
as contains by renaming txt to expres and is classified as done by renaming txt to claimed. These
targets (contains and done) were chosen arbitrarily in advance, and our DAMP method had found the
new required variable names expres and claimed.
A APPENDIX - ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES
boolean f(Object target) {
for (Object elem: this.elements){
if (elem.equals(target)) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Prediction: contains (90.93%)
Target: escape Target: load
boolean f(Object target) {
for (Object upperhexdigits: this.elements){
if (upperhexdigits.equals(target)) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
boolean f(Object target) {
for (Object musicservice: this.elements){
if ( musicservice.equals(target)) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Prediction: escape (99.97%) Prediction: load (93.92%)
Fig. 14. A snippet classified correctly as contains by the model of code2vec.org. The same example is
classified as escape by renaming elem to upperhexdigits and is classified as load by renaming
elem to musicservice. These targets (escape and load) were chosen arbitrarily in advance, and our
DAMP method had found the new required variable names upperhexdigits and musicservice.
int f(String target,
ArrayList<String> array) {
int count = 0;
for (String str: array) {
if (target.equals(str)) {
count++;
}
}
return count;
}
Prediction: count (42.77%)
Target: sort Target: contains
int f(String target,
ArrayList<String> orderedlist) {
int count = 0;
for (String str: orderedlist) {
if (target.equals(str)) {
count++;
}
}
return count;
}
int f(String thisentry,
ArrayList<String> array) {
int count = 0;
for (String str: array) {
if (thisentry.equals(str)) {
count++;
}
}
return count;
}
Prediction: sort (51.55%) Prediction: contains (99.99%)
Fig. 15. A snippet classified correctly as count by the model of code2vec.org. The same example is classified
as sort by renaming array to orderedlist and is classified as contains by renaming target to
thisentry. These targets (sort and contains) were chosen arbitrarily in advance, and our DAMP
method had found the new required variable names orderedlist and thisentry.
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Correctly predicted example Adversarial perturbation
Target: _setterBuilder
public class PropertyEmitter
{
...
private readonly FieldBuilder _fieldBuilder;
private readonly MethodBuilder _getterBuilder;
private readonly PropertyBuilder _propertyBuilder;
private readonly MethodBuilder _setterBuilder;
public PropertyEmitter(
TypeBuilder owner,
PropertyDescription property,
FieldBuilder propertyChangedField)
{
var name = property.Name;
var propertyType = property.Type;
_fieldBuilder = owner.DefineField($"<{name}>",
propertyType, FieldAttributes.Private);
_propertyBuilder = owner.DefineProperty(name,
PropertyAttributes.None, propertyType, null);
_getterBuilder = owner.DefineMethod($"get_{name}",
MethodAttributes.Public
| MethodAttributes.Virtual
| MethodAttributes.HideBySig
| MethodAttributes.SpecialName,
propertyType,
Type.EmptyTypes);
ILGenerator getterIl =
_getterBuilder.GetILGenerator();
getterIl.Emit(OpCodes.Ldarg_0);
getterIl.Emit(OpCodes.Ldfld, _fieldBuilder);
getterIl.Emit(OpCodes.Ret);
_propertyBuilder.SetGetMethod(_getterBuilder);
if(!property.CanWrite)
{
return;
}
_setterBuilder = owner.DefineMethod($"set_{name}",
MethodAttributes.Public
| MethodAttributes.Virtual
| MethodAttributes.HideBySig
| MethodAttributes.SpecialName,
typeof (void),
new[] {propertyType});
ILGenerator setteril =
_setterBuilder.GetILGenerator();
setteril.Emit(OpCodes.Ldarg_0);
setteril.Emit(OpCodes.Ldarg_1);
setteril.Emit(OpCodes.Stfld, _fieldBuilder);
if (propertyChangedField != null)
{
setteril.Emit(OpCodes.Ldarg_0);
setteril.Emit(OpCodes.Dup);
setteril.Emit(
OpCodes.Ldfld,
propertyChangedField);
setteril.Emit(OpCodes.Ldstr, name);
setteril.Emit(
OpCodes.Call,
ProxyBaseNotifyPropertyChanged);
}
setteril.Emit(OpCodes.Ret);
_propertyBuilder.SetSetMethod(_setterBuilder);
}
...
public MethodBuilder GetGetter(Type requiredType)
=> !requiredType.IsAssignableFrom(PropertyType)
? throw new InvalidOperationException(
"Types are not compatible")
: _getterBuilder ;
}
(a)
public class PropertyEmitter
{
...
private readonly FieldBuilder _fieldBuilder;
private readonly MethodBuilder _getterBuilder;
private readonly PropertyBuilder _propertyBuilder;
private readonly MethodBuilder _setterBuilder;
public PropertyEmitter(
TypeBuilder owner,
PropertyDescription property,
FieldBuilder propertyChangedField)
{
var name = property.Name;
var propertyType = property.Type;
_fieldBuilder = owner.DefineField($"<{name}>",
propertyType, FieldAttributes.Private);
_propertyBuilder = owner.DefineProperty(name,
PropertyAttributes.None, propertyType, null);
_getterBuilder = owner.DefineMethod($"get_{name}",
MethodAttributes.Public
| MethodAttributes.Virtual
| MethodAttributes.HideBySig
| MethodAttributes.SpecialName,
propertyType,
Type.EmptyTypes);
ILGenerator getterIl =
_getterBuilder.GetILGenerator();
getterIl.Emit(OpCodes.Ldarg_0);
getterIl.Emit(OpCodes.Ldfld, _fieldBuilder);
getterIl.Emit(OpCodes.Ret);
_propertyBuilder.SetGetMethod(_getterBuilder);
if(!property.CanWrite)
{
return;
}
_setterBuilder = owner.DefineMethod($"set_{name}",
MethodAttributes.Public
| MethodAttributes.Virtual
| MethodAttributes.HideBySig
| MethodAttributes.SpecialName,
typeof (void),
new[] {propertyType});
ILGenerator va =
_setterBuilder.GetILGenerator();
va.Emit(OpCodes.Ldarg_0);
va.Emit(OpCodes.Ldarg_1);
va.Emit(OpCodes.Stfld, _fieldBuilder);
if (propertyChangedField != null)
{
va.Emit(OpCodes.Ldarg_0);
va.Emit(OpCodes.Dup);
va.Emit(
OpCodes.Ldfld,
propertyChangedField);
va.Emit(OpCodes.Ldstr, name);
va.Emit(
OpCodes.Call,
ProxyBaseNotifyPropertyChanged);
}
va.Emit(OpCodes.Ret);
_propertyBuilder.SetSetMethod(_setterBuilder);
}
...
public MethodBuilder GetGetter(Type requiredType)
=> !requiredType.IsAssignableFrom(PropertyType)
? throw new InvalidOperationException(
"Types are not compatible")
: _setterBuilder ;
}
(b)
Fig. 16. A C# VarMisuse example which is classified correctly as _getterBuilder in the method
GetGetter by the GGNN model. Given the code and the target _setterBuilder, our approach re-
names a local variable setteril in another method, making the model predict the wrong variable in the
GetGetter method, thus introducing a real bug in the method GetGetter.
Correctly predicted example Adversarial perturbation
Target: typeBuilder
public static class ProxyGenerator
{
...
private static ModuleBuilder CreateProxyModule()
{
AssemblyName name = new AssemblyName(
"AutoMapper.Proxies");
name.SetPublicKey(privateKey);
name.SetPublicKeyToken(privateKeyToken);
AssemblyBuilder builder =
AssemblyBuilder.DefineDynamicAssembly(
name, AssemblyBuilderAccess.Run);
return builder.DefineDynamicModule(
"AutoMapper.Proxies.emit");
}
private static Type EmitProxy(
TypeDescription typeDescription)
{
var interfaceType = typeDescription.Type;
...
if(typeof(INotifyPropertyChanged)
.IsAssignableFrom(interfaceType))
{
...
}
...
foreach(var property in propertiesToImplement)
{
if(fieldBuilders.TryGetValue(property.Name,
out var propertyEmitter))
{
if((propertyEmitter.PropertyType
!= property.Type) && (
(property.CanWrite)
|| (!property.Type.IsAssignableFrom(
propertyEmitter.PropertyType))))
{
throw new ArgumentException(
$"The interface has a conflicting
property {property.Name}",
nameof( interfaceType ));
}
}
else
{
fieldBuilders.Add(property.Name,
new PropertyEmitter(
typeBuilder,
property, propertyChangedField));
}
}
return typeBuilder.CreateType();
}
}
(a)
public static class ProxyGenerator
{
...
private static ModuleBuilder CreateProxyModule()
{
AssemblyName name = new AssemblyName(
"AutoMapper.Proxies");
name.SetPublicKey(privateKey);
name.SetPublicKeyToken(privateKeyToken);
AssemblyBuilder bzodhi =
AssemblyBuilder.DefineDynamicAssembly(
name, AssemblyBuilderAccess.Run);
return bzodhi.DefineDynamicModule(
"AutoMapper.Proxies.emit");
}
private static Type EmitProxy(
TypeDescription typeDescription)
{
var interfaceType = typeDescription.Type;
...
if(typeof(INotifyPropertyChanged)
.IsAssignableFrom(interfaceType))
{
...
}
...
foreach(var property in propertiesToImplement)
{
if(fieldBuilders.TryGetValue(property.Name,
out var propertyEmitter))
{
if((propertyEmitter.PropertyType
!= property.Type) && (
(property.CanWrite)
|| (!property.Type.IsAssignableFrom(
propertyEmitter.PropertyType))))
{
throw new ArgumentException(
$"The interface has a conflicting
property {property.Name}",
nameof( typeBuilder ));
}
}
else
{
fieldBuilders.Add(property.Name,
new PropertyEmitter(
typeBuilder,
property, propertyChangedField));
}
}
return typeBuilder.CreateType();
}
}
(b)
Fig. 17. A C# VarMisuse example which is classified correctly as interfaceType in the method
EmitProxy by the GGNN model. Given the code and the target typeBuilder, our approach renames a
local variable builder in another method, making the model predict the wrong variable in the EmitProxy
method, thus introducing a real bug in the method EmitProxy.
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Correctly predicted example Adversarial perturbation
Target: DestinationType
struct TypePair : IEquatable<TypePair>
{
public static TypePair
Create<TSource, TDestination>(
TSource source, TDestination destination,
Type sourceType, Type destinationType)
{
if(source != null)
{
sourceType = source.GetType();
}
if(destination != null)
{
destinationType = destination.GetType();
}
return new TypePair(
sourceType, destinationType);
}
...
public Type SourceType { get; }
public Type DestinationType { get; }
...
public TypePair? GetOpenGenericTypePair()
{
if(!IsGeneric)
{
return null;
}
var sourceGenericDefinition =
SourceType.IsGenericType() ?
SourceType .GetGenericTypeDefinition()
: SourceType;
var destinationGenericDefinition =
DestinationType.IsGenericType() ?
DestinationType.GetGenericTypeDefinition() :
DestinationType;
return new TypePair(sourceGenericDefinition,
destinationGenericDefinition);
}
}
(a)
struct TypePair : IEquatable<TypePair>
{
public static TypePair
Create<TSource, TDestination>(
TSource ebwhajqa, TDestination destination,
Type sourceType, Type destinationType)
{
if(ebwhajqa != null)
{
sourceType = ebwhajqa.GetType();
}
if(destination != null)
{
destinationType = destination.GetType();
}
return new TypePair(
sourceType, destinationType);
}
...
public Type SourceType { get; }
public Type DestinationType { get; }
...
public TypePair? GetOpenGenericTypePair()
{
if(!IsGeneric)
{
return null;
}
var sourceGenericDefinition =
SourceType.IsGenericType() ?
DestinationType .GetGenericTypeDefinition()
: SourceType;
var destinationGenericDefinition =
DestinationType.IsGenericType() ?
DestinationType.GetGenericTypeDefinition() :
DestinationType;
return new TypePair(sourceGenericDefinition,
destinationGenericDefinition);
}
}
(b)
Fig. 18. A C# VarMisuse example which is classified correctly by the GGNN model. Given the code and the
target DestinationType, our approach renames a local variable source in another method, making the
model predict the wrong variable, thus introducing a real bug.
Correctly predicted example Adversarial perturbation
Target: destEnumType
public class EnumToEnumMapper : IObjectMapper
{
public static TDestination
Map<TSource, TDestination>(TSource source)
{
var sourceEnumType =
ElementTypeHelper.GetEnumerationType(
typeof(TSource));
var destEnumType =
ElementTypeHelper.GetEnumerationType(
typeof(TDestination));
if (!Enum.IsDefined(sourceEnumType, source))
{
return (TDestination)Enum.ToObject(
destEnumType, source);
}
if (!Enum.GetNames(destEnumType).Contains(
source.ToString(),
StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
var underlyingSourceType =
Enum.GetUnderlyingType( sourceEnumType );
var underlyingSourceValue =
System.Convert.ChangeType(
source, underlyingSourceType);
return (TDestination)Enum.ToObject(
destEnumType, underlyingSourceValue);
}
return (TDestination)Enum.Parse(
destEnumType, Enum.GetName(
sourceEnumType, source), true);
}
private static readonly MethodInfo MapMethodInfo =
typeof(EnumToEnumMapper).GetAllMethods().First(
_ => _.IsStatic);
public bool IsMatch(TypePair context)
{
var sourceEnumType =
ElementTypeHelper.GetEnumerationType(
context.SourceType);
var destEnumType =
ElementTypeHelper.GetEnumerationType(
context.DestinationType);
return sourceEnumType != null
&& destEnumType != null;
}
}
(a)
public class EnumToEnumMapper : IObjectMapper
{
public static TDestination
Map<TSource, TDestination>(TSource source)
{
var sourceEnumType =
ElementTypeHelper.GetEnumerationType(
typeof(TSource));
var destEnumType =
ElementTypeHelper.GetEnumerationType(
typeof(TDestination));
if (!Enum.IsDefined(sourceEnumType, source))
{
return (TDestination)Enum.ToObject(
destEnumType, source);
}
if (!Enum.GetNames(destEnumType).Contains(
source.ToString(),
StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
var underlyingSourceType =
Enum.GetUnderlyingType( destEnumType );
var underlyingSourceValue =
System.Convert.ChangeType(
source, underlyingSourceType);
return (TDestination)Enum.ToObject(
destEnumType, underlyingSourceValue);
}
return (TDestination)Enum.Parse(
destEnumType, Enum.GetName(
sourceEnumType, source), true);
}
private static readonly MethodInfo MapMethodInfo =
typeof(EnumToEnumMapper).GetAllMethods().First(
_ => _.IsStatic);
public bool IsMatch(TypePair tbeqtxv)
{
var sourceEnumType =
ElementTypeHelper.GetEnumerationType(
tbeqtxv.SourceType);
var destEnumType =
ElementTypeHelper.GetEnumerationType(
tbeqtxv.DestinationType);
return sourceEnumType != null
&& destEnumType != null;
}
}
(b)
Fig. 19. A C# VarMisuse example which is classified correctly as sourceEnumType in the method Map
by the GGNN model. Given the code and the target destEnumType, our approach renames a local vari-
able context in another method, making the model predict the wrong variable in the Map method, thus
introducing a real bug in the method Map.
